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1. Introduction
Interactions are a core part of all multi-agent systems. They occur because of the inter-depend-
encies which inevitably exist between the agents and they manifest themselves in many differ-
ent forms—including cooperation, coordination, collaboration. However perhaps the most
fundamental and powerful mechanism for managing these inter-agent dependencies at run-time
is negotiation—the process by which a group of agents communicate with one to try and come
to a mutually acceptable agreement on some matter. Negotiation underpins attempts to cooper-
ate and coordinate (both between artificial and human agents) and is required both when the
agents are self interested and when they are cooperative. It is so central precisely because the
agents are autonomous. For an agent to influence an acquaintance, the acquaintance needs to be
convinced that it should act in a particular way. The means of achieving this state are to make
proposals, trade options, offer concessions, and (hopefully) come to a mutually acceptable
agreement. In short, to negotiate.
Given its ubiquity and importance in many different contexts, negotiation theory covers a broad
range of phenomena and encompasses multifarious approaches (e.g. from Artificial Intelli-
gence, Social Psychology, and Game Theory). Despite this variety, however, negotiation re-
search can be considered to deal with three broad topics:
• Negotiation Protocols: the set of rules which govern the interaction. This covers the
permissible types of participants (e.g. the negotiators and any relevant third parties),
the negotiation states (e.g. accepting bids, negotiation closed), the events which cause
negotiation states to change (e.g. no more bidders, bid accepted), and the valid actions
of the participants in particular states (e.g. which messages can be sent by whom, to
whom, at what stage).
• Negotiation Objects: the range of issues over which agreement must be reached. At
one extreme, the object may contain a single issue (such as price), while on the other
hand it may cover hundreds of issues (related to price, quality, timings, penalties,
terms and conditions, etc.). Orthogonal to the agreement structure is the issue of the
types of operation which can be performed on it as dictated by the negotiation proto-
col. In the simplest case, the structure and the contents of the agreement are ﬁxed and
participants can either accept or reject it (i.e. a take it or leave it offer). At the next
level, participants have the ﬂexibility to change the values of the issues in the negotia-
tion object (i.e. they can make counter-proposals to ensure the agreement better ﬁts
their negotiation objectives). Finally, participants might be allowed to dynamically
extend the structure of the negotiation object (e.g. a car salesman may add one year’s
free insurance into a negotiation in order to clinch the deal).IWMAS98 Submission
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• Agents’ Decision Making Models: the decision making apparatus the participants
employ to act in line with the negotiation protocol in order to achieve their negotiation
objectives. The sophistication of the model, as well as the range of decisions which
have to be made, are inﬂuenced by the protocol in place, by the nature of the negotia-
tion object, and by the range of operations which can be performed on it.
The relative importance of these three topics varies according to the negotiation and environ-
mental context. Thus, in some circumstances the negotiation protocol is the dominant concern
(e.g. [8] [13]). For example, the system designer may determine that the negotiation is best or-
ganised using a particular form of auction (e.g. English, Dutch, Vickrey, First-Price Sealed
Bid). This mechanism design choice constrains the types of operations which can be performed
on the negotiation object (no counter-proposals or issue extensions) and prescribes the behav-
iour of the agents’ decision making models (e.g. strategic behaviour is pointless and agents
should simply bid their true reservation value). In other cases, however, the agent’s decision
making model is the dominant concern (e.g. [1] [9] [11]). Here, the protocol does not prescribe
an agent’s behaviour and there is scope for strategic reasoning to determine the best course of
action. In such cases, the relative success of two agents is determined by the effectiveness of
their reasoning model—the better the model, the greater the agent’s reward.
Given the wide variety of possibilities, it is clear that there is no universally best approach or
technique for inter-agent negotiation. Rather, there is an eclectic bag of methods with properties
and performance characteristics which vary widely depending on the negotiation context.
Against this background, our work concentrates on a particular class of negotiation which we
term argumentation-based. In this form of negotiation, agents generate and exchange argu-
ments to back up or justify their negotiation stance. In more detail, this paper seeks to: (i) mo-
tivate the importance of an argumentation-based approach (section 2); (ii) describe the
architecture of an agent’s decision making model as it pertains to supporting argumentation-
based negotiation (section 3); and (iii) indicate the techniques we have developed to date for
formally specifying the mechanisms of one such model (section 4).
2. A Generic Framework for Argumentation-Based Negotiation
Negotiation can be viewed as a distributed search through a space of potential agreements (fig-
ure 1). The dimensionality and topology of this space is determined by the structure of the ne-
gotiation object. Indeed, one could consider each attribute of the negotiation object to have a
separate dimension associated with it; clearly, in this view, the space of figure 1 concerns two
attributes. Thus, when new issues are added (or old ones removed) during the course of a nego-
tiation, then extra dimensions are added (or removed) and the number of points of agreement
may increase (or decrease). Similarly, if an agent changes one of the values of one of the at-
tributes within an offer, it is moving from one point in the agreement space to another. For more
on this metaphor for viewing the agreement space see [4] [5].
For a given negotiation, the participants are the active components who determine the direction
of the search. At the start of this process, each agent has a portion of the space in which it is
willing to make agreements. Typically, it also has some means of rating the points in its space
and some means of using this rating to determine the actual agreements it makes. Negotiation
proceeds by the participants suggesting specific points (or regions) in the agreement space as
potentially acceptable. During the negotiation process, the participants’ agreement spaces (as
well as their rating functions) may change: they may expand, contract, or shift, for instance be-
cause their environment changes, or because they are persuaded to change their views. TheIWMAS98 Submission
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search terminates when the required number of participants find a mutually acceptable point in
the agreement space or when there are insufficient negotiators left to reach an agreement.
From this representation, it can be seen that the minimal negotiation capabilities are: (i) to pro-
posesomepartoftheagreementspaceasbeingacceptable;and(ii)torespondtosuchaproposal
indicating whether it is acceptable. In other words, the minimum capability required of a nego-
tiating agent is the ability to make and respond to proposals. Now since our work is set with in
the context of agents reaching agreements about some joint problem, we consider a proposal to
be a solution to that joint problem; either a single complete proposed solution, a single partial
solution, or a group of complete or partial solutions. In terms of the agreement space, these dif-
ferent kinds of proposals become a single point, a region of the space, a set of points, or a set of
regions of the space (for example a partial solution would be any region of the space in which
the quality was above some level and the price below a certain threshold). We allow a proposal
to be made either independently of other agents’ proposals, or based on previous comments
made by other agents.
The most minimal kind of negotiation we can imagine is that which takes place in a Dutch auc-
tion. The auctioneer (one agent in the negotiation) calls out prices (negotiation objects with a
singleattribute).Whenthereisnosignalofacceptancefromtheotherpartiesintheauction(oth-
er agents in the negotiation) the auctioneer makes a new offer which it believes will be more
acceptable (by reducing the price). Here, because of the convention (protocol) under which the
auction operates, a lack of response is sufficient feedback for the auctioneer to infer a lack of
acceptance. However in anything more complex than this rather special case, the minimal re-
quirement for the “other agents” is that they are able to indicate dissatisfaction with proposals
that they find unacceptable.
If agents can only accept or reject others’ proposals, then negotiation can be very time consum-
ing and inefficient since the proposer has no means of ascertaining why the proposal is unac-
ceptable, nor whether the agents are close to an agreement, nor in which direction of the
agreement space it should move next. Hence the proposer is essentially picking points in the
agreement space based only on its own imperatives and hoping that it will eventually stumble
upon something acceptable. To improve the efficiency of the negotiation process, the recipient
needs to be able to provide more useful feedback on the proposals it receives than just whether
or not it agrees to them. This feedback can take the form of a critique (comments on which parts
of the proposal the agent likes or dislikes1)o racounter-proposal (an alternative proposal gen-
1. To avoid introducing an unnecessarily large number of different types of statement, we consider simple
accept/reject statements to be special cases of critiques.
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erated in response to a proposal). From such feedback, the proposer should be able to generate
a proposal which is more likely to lead to an agreement (if it chooses to do so).
Consider the concept of a critique first. A critique provides two forms of feedback: (i) it sug-
gestsconstraintsonparticularnegotiationissuesand(ii)itindicatesacceptance/rejectionofpar-
ticular parts of the proposal (or indeed of the whole proposal). To illustrate these points,
consider the following short dialogues which are examples of proposals followed by critiques:
A: I propose that you provide me with service X under the following condi-
tions.
B: I am happy with the price of X, but the delivery date is too late.
A: I propose that I will provide you with service Y if you provide me with
service X.
B: I don’t want service Y.
In the first case, the critique indicates those aspects of the proposal which are acceptable and
those which need to be modified and it also suggests a constraint on one of the issues (delivery
date earlier than the current suggestion). In the second case, the critique indicates outright re-
jection of part of the proposal. Generally speaking, the more information placed in the critique,
the easier it is for the original agent to determine the boundaries of its opponent’s agreement
space.
Counter proposals are the second feedback mechanism. A counter-proposal is simply a propos-
al, which is more favourable to the sender, made in response to a previous proposal. The fol-
lowing are examples of proposals followed by counter-proposals:
A: I propose that you provide me with service X.
B: I propose that I provide you with service X if you provide me with serv-
ice Z.
A: I propose that I provide you with service Y if you provide me with serv-
ice X.
B: I propose that I provide you with service X if you provide me with serv-
ice Z.
In the first case, the counter-proposal extends the initial proposal, and in the second case it
amends part of the initial proposal. Counter-proposals differ from critiques in that the feedback
is less explicit (the recipient of a counter-proposal has to infer the constraints and preferences
from the way the proposal is re-constituted), but generally more detailed (since specific regions
of the opponent’s agreement space are identified).
On their own, proposals, critiques and counter-proposals are bald statements of what agents
want. Thus, their scope is confined solely to the structure of the negotiation object. While it is
perfectly possible to base negotiations on just these object-level constructs (indeed this is pre-
cisely what most extant models do), doing so diminishes some of the potential of negotiation
technology. For example, it means that agents cannot:
• justify their negotiation stance;
An agent might have a compelling reason for adopting a particular negotiation stance.
For example, a company may not be legally entitled to sell a particular type of productIWMAS98 Submission
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to a particular type of consumer or a particular item may be out of stock and the next
delivery might not be until the following month. In such cases, the ability to provide
the justiﬁcation for its attitude towards a particular issue can allow the opponent to
more fully appreciate an agent’s constraints and behaviour.
• persuade one another to change their negotiation stance;
Agents sometimes need to actively change their opponents agreement space, or its rat-
ing over that space, in order for a deal to be possible. In such cases, agents seek to
construct arguments which they believe will make their opponent look more favoura-
bly upon their proposal. Thus, arguments seek to identify opportunities for such
change (e.g. a car salesman throws in a stereo with a car to increase the value of the
good), create new opportunities for change (e.g. a car salesman adds a new dimension
to the rating function by highlighting the cars novel security features) or modify exist-
ing assessment criteria (e.g. car salesman gets buyer to change evaluation function by
convincing him that security is more important than mileage).
In both cases, negotiators are providing arguments to support their stance (hence argumenta-
tion-based negotiation). Thus, in addition to generating proposals, counter-proposals and cri-
tiques, the negotiator is seeking to make the proposal more attractive (acceptable) by providing
additionalmeta-levelinformationintheformofargumentsforitsposition.Thenatureandtypes
of the arguments can vary enormously (see [2] [3] [11] for more details), however common cat-
egories include: threats (failure to accept this proposal means something negative will happen
toyou),rewards(acceptanceofthisproposalmeanssomethingpositivewillhappentoyou),and
appeals (you should prefer this option over that alternative for some reason). Whatever its pre-
cise form, the role of the supporting argument is either to modify the recipient’s region of ac-
ceptability or its rating function over this region. In so doing, arguments have the potential2 to
increase the likelihood and/or the speed of agreements being reached3. In the former case, by
persuading agents to accept deals that they may not originally have countenanced. In the latter
case,byconvincingagentstoaccepttheirpositiononagivenissueandtoceasenegotiatingover
it.
3. Building Argumentation-Based Negotiators
To design and build an agent capable of effective argumentation-based negotiation, it requires
the following:
1. Mechanisms for passing proposals and their supporting arguments in a way that other
agents understand.
2. Techniques for generating proposals (counter-proposals or critiques) and for providing
the supporting arguments;
Proposal generation involves two main activities: (i) instantiating the negotiation
2. Poorly designed argumentation systems also have the potential to increase the length of the negotiation as the
various merits of arguments and counter-arguments are debated. However, poor design of the other aspects of the
negotiation technology can have similarly adverse effects, and so it is not something speciﬁc to argumentation-
based negotiation.
3. For example, if arguments are preferred if they are more likely to lead to an agreement (which requires some
metric on the agreement space) it is possible to prove that argumentation leads to quicker agreement [12].IWMAS98 Submission
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object in accordance with the agent’s acceptability region and its rating function; (ii)
determining which argument(s) should accompany the agreement (if any) in order to
maximise the likelihood of it being accepted. The complexity of the former point is
determined by the nature of the strategic reasoning which is appropriate for the given
negotiation protocol. This may vary from little reasoning, to maintaining complex
models of negotiation opponents and trying to make predictions from them. In terms
of the latter point, in the majority of cases there will be many types of argument which
can be made in support of a proposal (varying from explanations to threats). In deter-
mining which ones to send, the agent needs to pick those arguments which are most
likely to be effective, but within the constraints of the agent’s negotiation objectives.
Thus, for example, continually issuing threats may provoke short-term gains, but may
not be a good long-term strategy if the agent has to interact frequently with the same
group.
3. Techniques for assessing proposals (counter-proposals or critiques) and their associated
supporting arguments;
Received proposals need to be evaluated to determine how the agent should respond.
This evaluation involves two main facets: (i) assessing the desirability of the proposal
contained in the negotiation object; (ii) assessing the likely impact of the supporting
arguments. From this, a number of potential outcomes are possible: the negotiation
object is acceptable as it stands, the negotiation object alone is unacceptable but the
supporting arguments overcome this and make the proposal acceptable, or the negoti-
ation object is unacceptable and the supporting arguments are insufﬁcient to warrant
proposal acceptance4. Having assessed the proposal, the agent may decide to update
its acceptability region or rating function to reﬂect the incoming proposal’s argu-
ments.
4. Techniques for responding to proposals (counter-proposals or critiques) and their associ-
ated supporting arguments;
Having assessed a proposal, the agent can respond by accepting it, by rejecting it, by
generating a critique, or by returning a counter-proposal. So the ﬁrst functional
requirement is to determine which of these courses of action should be taken. In the
case of a critique, the agent has to determine what components it wants to accept and
which it wants to reject, which issues it intends to provide constraints on, and what
such constraints should be. It must then decide what arguments (if any) it will offer in
support of this stance, and how it should respond to any arguments which accompa-
nied the incoming proposal (varying from ignoring them to trying to undermine
them). Counter-proposals are handled in a broadly similar manner, except that rather
than giving feedback and constraints the agent has to instantiate the negotiation object
with particular values.
While these argumentation specific capabilities undoubtedly increase the complexity of the
agent,wefeelsucheffortsarejustifiedbytheincreasedrewardswhichargumentation-basedne-
gotiation promises.
4. The fourth case of the proposal being acceptable and the argument making it unacceptable is highly unlikely
to occur in practise.IWMAS98 Submission
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4. Progress to Date
The categories given in the previous section can be used as a framework within which to assess
our work to date on argumentation-based negotiation.
We have identified the basic mechanisms for passing proposals and their supporting arguments
[10], and have an implementation of these mechanisms which allows simple negotiating agents
to be easily constructed [1]. This work satisfies requirement 1 above.
We have experimented with various mechanisms for generating proposals [1] [9] (albeit not in
situations in which arguments are taken into account) and with some simple mechanisms for
providing arguments (where these are built by creating plans for joint action and using the plans
as arguments for their adoption) [6] [7]. Thus we have done some work on requirements 2(i)
and 2(ii), though the generation of supporting arguments is an area of continuing research.
We have looked at the use of various mechanisms for assessing the worth of proposals [1] [9].
We have also considered a number of ways of assessing the worth of arguments which support
proposals, both those based on domain specific information [10], and more general mechanisms
[6] [7], which rate arguments by considering what counter-arguments can be built against them.
This work addresses requirements 3(i) and 3(ii).
Finally, we have considered ways to respond to proposals [1] [9] when just trading proposals,
and have considered how to respond to arguments when response is guided by trying to find ar-
gumentswhichwilldefeatthosealreadymadebytheotheragentsinthenegotiation[6][7].This
work addresses requirements 4(i) and 4(ii).
Ascanbeseenfromthis,ourworktodatehaslookedatalltheareasweconsiderimportantfrom
the point of view of developing agents capable of argument-based negotiation. However, sadly,
this does not mean that we are close to being able to build such agents! Before we can, we need
to (a) extend our work on building, assessing and responding to arguments so that we can carry
out such activities when proposals are more realistic than the simple joint plans we have worked
on so far and (b) extend our implementation to be able to automate this behaviour.
5. Conclusions
This paper has argued for the centrality of negotiation in multi-agent systems research and has
provided an informal framework for describing its key features. A case has been made for ne-
gotiation to include arguments to justify positions and to persuade opponents to change their
stance.Thekeycomponentswhichneedtobeaddressedwhenbuildinganargumentation-based
negotiator have been outlined and our progress in this endeavour have been presented.
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